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Secure Mobile Payments Without Network Connectivity 
ABSTRACT 
Mobile payments depend on the availability of internet connectivity, e.g., to enable a 
centralized service to authenticate a payment. This disclosure describes techniques to enable 
peer-to-peer mobile payments in the absence of a network. A user has an initial amount, referred 
to as the balance, that is transferred to their mobile device from a balance provider, e.g., a 
financial institution. The balance is digitally signed by both the user and the balance provider. To 
transact in the absence of a network, peer users perform a contactless payment as follows. The 
receiver of funds verifies the availability of funds by examining the prior, authenticated, 
transaction records of the sender. A transaction record including the transaction amount is 
created and made immutable and secure using cryptographic techniques. When either the sender 
or receiver regains network connectivity, the transaction is settled with the balance provider. 
Double-spend attempts by a malicious sender are forestalled by enabling secure maintenance of 
the true balance on a sender’s device (even in the absence of a network), and by enabling the 
receiver to settle with the sender’s balance provider on the basis of an authenticated transaction 
record. 
KEYWORDS
● Mobile payment 
● Peer-to-peer payment 
● Networkless payment 
● Double-spend attack 
● Near-field Communication (NFC) 
● Keypair 
● Public-key cryptography 
● Digital cash 
● Decentralized payments
2
Bera et al.: Secure Mobile Payments Without Network Connectivity
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020
BACKGROUND 
Digital payments depend on the availability of internet connectivity to enable a 
centralized service to authenticate a payment. The network dependency prevents mobile 
payments in the absence of the network, or even when there is a spike in network traffic. Even if 
sufficient data center capacity is provided to handle spikes in traffic, the bandwidth and coverage 
of the underlying mobile network remain a bottleneck. Also, the extra data center capacity, 
which requires investment, remains underutilized during non-peak times. Network connectivity 
remains a problem in many parts of the world. Even in relatively developed regions of the world, 
network connectivity can be a problem in densely-populated areas such as transit stations, 
shopping malls, tech parks, etc. 
DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure describes techniques to enable peer-to-peer mobile payments in the 
absence of a network, and on devices that may not have fully secure operating environments. 
When a mobile device of a user is connected to a network, the user requests an initial amount, 
referred to as the balance, to be transferred to their mobile device from a balance provider, e.g., a 
financial or other institution, using an acceptable financial instrument. With user permission, the 
mobile device is remotely tested for integrity, e.g., the absence of malicious hardware or 
software, by the balance provider using a mobile-device integrity verifier.  
For example, the integrity of the device can be verified by having the device generating a 
keypair, and using the keypair to have the device attest itself with a root certificate issued by a 
trusted certificate authority. Upon successful remote verification of the integrity of the user 
device, the user is issued a user-identity bundle by an identity issue service (IIS) and a balance 
by the balance provider, digitally signed by both the user and the balance provider. For safety 
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reasons, the balance can have an expiry date, e.g., a date after which it cannot be used without 
reconfirmation by the balance provider. 
The user-identity bundle enables peers to identify and authenticate each other during a 
transaction. The user-identity bundle can include data such as user name, user public key, 
receiver public key, identity expiry time, special permissions (if any), risk score, etc. The user-
identity bundle is valid for a limited period of time; after its expiry, the credentials are refreshed 
by re-connecting to the IIS. Upon reconnection, the state of the user device and their previous 
transactions are validated before issuing a freshly-signed user-identity bundle, thus reducing the 
risk of abuse.  
In the absence of a network, peer users bring their mobile devices near each other (or 
otherwise establish peer-to-peer communication between the devices) to effect a contactless 
payment (e.g., over Bluetooth or NFC), without either device authenticating itself over a 
network, as follows. The peer devices connect, authenticate each other, and set up a secure 
communication channel using corresponding user identities, which are previously issued and 
digitally signed by a trusted third party.  
With appropriate permissions set up, the receiver device that is to receive funds verifies 
the availability of sufficient balance at the sender to cover the transaction by examining the prior, 
authenticated, transaction records of the sender, e.g., going back to the initial deposit made by 
the balance provider. For the current transaction, a new transaction record including the present 
transaction amount is created on both sender and receiver. The transaction record is signed with a 
transaction-specific keypair generated by the secure key storage of the sender’s device and 
attested to by the sender’s device (e.g. using a hardware-backed trusted execution environment 
of the device); made immutable by being signed by the private keys of both parties to the 
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transaction; and is appended to ledgers maintained at both sender and receiver device. When 
either the sender or receiver regains network connectivity, the transaction is settled with the 
balance provider. A sender can settle with all their counterparty receivers. A given receiver can 
settle with not only a given sender but with all the receiver-counterparties of the given sender 
who transacted with the given sender prior to the given receiver, without being privy to the other 
receivers’ transactions with the sender. The ability of any single receiver in the pool of receivers 
to settle other receivers’ transactions adds redundancy, e.g., even in an environment of generally 
poor network connectivity, transactions can be rapidly settled. 
The use of transaction-specific keypairs ensures that any attempt by the sender to alter or 
delete a transaction from the ledger, e.g., to fraudulently claim a larger running balance or to 
cheat a recipient of a previous transaction, results in further transactions being disabled. Because 
the receiver also has a copy of the authenticated transaction record, attempts by the sender to 
deny a transaction fail, as the receiver can always settle with the sender’s balance provider upon 
the re-availability of a network connection. Double-spend attempts by the sender are forestalled 
by enabling a receiver to authenticate the true and current balance on a sender’s device (even in 
the absence of a network), and by enabling the receiver to settle with the sender’s balance 
provider on the basis of an authenticated transaction record. Cloning of the balance on another 
device is rendered ineffective by the user authentication and device integrity checks, and by 
binding the balance to the device.  
Aside from peer-to-peer mobile payments, the techniques of this disclosure can also be 
used to enable unlocking of paid services such as transit gates, hotel rooms, self-driven, shared 
vehicles, etc. 
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With user permission, the techniques can leverage further features of mobile devices if 
available, such as: 
● A hardware-backed secure key storage implemented in a trusted execution environment. 
Further, key material that resides on the hardware-backed secure key storage that cannot 
be extracted by pure software methods. 
● Biometric authentication. 
● A secure key storage that ensures that an application can access its own keys but not 
those of another application.  
● A keypair attestation that provides a reliable indicator of genuineness of the secure key 
storage, its capabilities, the state of the bootloader, and the integrity of the application. A 
secure key storage that supports keypair attestation, which in turn provides a verifiable 
chain of trust from the bootloader to the application. 
● Security mechanisms that ensure that compromising a mobile payments app and/or 
operating system (OS) at runtime is relatively non-trivial.  
Key material that is non-extractable from the secure key storage via software methods 
ensures that secret keys cannot be stolen or tampered with. The secure key storage also ensures 
that the keys of one app/process cannot be used by another process in an uncompromised OS. 
Hardware security modules or secure elements provide an added benefit that hardware attacks to 
steal or tamper the secret keys are also non-trivial. Per the techniques, mobile devices that 
include the above features can perform purely offline transactions, e.g., where both sender and 
receiver are offline during the transaction. 
Keypair attestation is a determining factor to establish trust between the two peers. 
Keypair attestation on hardware-backed secure key storage reliably indicates whether: the device 
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bootloader is unlocked; the boot state is not verified; and/or the application has been modified. If 
the receiver finds that any of the above is true, the transaction with the sender can be declined or 
proceed to enforce online authentication of the transaction. 
If the mobile device is compromised, e.g., by a reboot of the device to unlock the 
bootloader and subsequent installation of a rootkit, the previously issued balance gets destroyed. 
The user is required to obtain a fresh balance again, triggering a mobile-device integrity 
verification, which in turn indicates a compromised/unlocked device. The balance provider that 
issued the original balance can then deny issuing new balance to the user. 
Signature (key) S 
Private key (sk stands for secret key) sk  
Public key (pk stands for public key) pk  
The identity private key of a sender sku 
The identity private key of the 1st receiver skr1 
The public key of the nth transaction keypair pkn
A balance-provider (or identity-provider) I’s private key skI
Signature operating on data T using private key sk Ssk(T) 
Table 1: Notation 
Table 1 illustrates the notation used in this disclosure. The balance can be signed by the 
user and by the balance provider, which can be, e.g., on the RAM of a user device, and an 
immutable ledger of transactions, which can be, e.g., on the filesystem of the device. The balance 
provider issues a balance to the user, which remains immutable through its expiry. The issued 
balance, its expiry date, the user’s public key, along with other data such as maximum allowed 
transaction, transaction IDs, etc., constitute a balance bundle.  
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The balance bundle, B, is signed by the balance provider (and identity provider) using its 
private key, as indicated: SskI(B). The balance bundle is also signed by the private key of the 
user. The signature of the balance provider can be verified by a party that wishes to transact with 
the user, thereby verifying the authenticity of the issued balance. As explained before, the 
balance bundle is issued after checking the integrity of the user’s device via a mobile-device 
integrity verifier and by keypair attestation. This balance bundle is linked to an underlying form 
of payment (FOP) that the user has linked with their payment-app account. Some example FOPs 
are unified payment interface (UPI) mandate with multiple executions; prepaid wallet; postpaid 
credit; etc. 
An immutable ledger of transactions is maintained by the sender and by the receiver. A 
transaction is made immutable by first signing the balance bundle with a per-transaction keypair 
generated by an app of the sender on the secure key storage of their device. This signature is 
called the transaction signature. When a balance is requested by the user, a zeroth keypair (sk0, 
pk0) is generated, which is used by the balance-provider to authenticate the user.  
The first transaction keypair is (sk1, pk1), the second transaction keypair is (sk2, pk2), 
etc. The signing of the balance bundle with the first secret key is indicated by Ssk1(B+t1), where 
t1 is the timestamp of the transaction. The sender cannot directly access a transaction keypair 
because of the properties of the secure key storage. The sender cannot rollback to the previous 
transaction because the app overwrites the previous transaction’s keypair when the current 
transaction keypair is generated. The receiver can verify the transaction keypair via the secure 
key storage attestation and transaction signature. Both sender (u) and first receiver (r1) then 
confirm the transaction signature by signing with their respective private keys, e.g., via the 
operations Ssku(T1) and Sskr1(T1) for the first transaction, where T1 is the transaction record, 
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e.g., the data structure that includes the transaction amount. This makes the transaction entry in 
the ledger immutable. 
In a similar manner, the second transaction, in which the sender u sends an amount 
encapsulated in transaction record T2 to a receiver r2 at a time t2 is signed by a transaction 
signature sk2, denoted Ssk2(B+t2), signed by the sender’s signature Ssku(T1+T2), and signed by 
the receiver’s signature Sskr2(T1+T2). For every signature made by a private key, the receiver 
obtains the corresponding public key via the secure channel, such that the receiver can verify the 
sender’s identity, balance in their account, the series of transactions conducted by the sender, etc. 
Threat models 
The described techniques can mitigate a variety of threats or attacks vectors, some of 
which are listed in Table 2. 
Attack vector Mitigation 
Sender unlocks the bootloader, roots the OS (a 
common way of rooting), and uses a re-
packaged unsigned app. 
Assuming that the bootloader state is included 
with the keypair attestation (which is true on 
devices with a secure hardware-backed key 
storage), the receiver app will detect that the 
bootloader is unlocked and deny the 
transaction.
Sender attempts to repackage the app on an 
uncompromised OS. 
An incorrect application signature will be 
reported to the secure key storage by the 
uncompromised OS; this can be detected by 
the receiver app.
Sender colludes with multiple receivers. Both 
sender and receiver run a re-packaged binary. 
The sender rolls back transactions and carries 
out multiple spends with the same balance 
bundle while the receivers skip the 
verification step. Then the receiver goes 
online to settle their transactions. 
Since the balance provider has information on 
the balance amount issued to the sender it can 
reliably detect that the transaction amount 
received from that sender is higher than the 
balance issued. 
Also, when the receiver goes online to claim 
their money, the attestation from their secure 
key storage would be verified at the server, and 
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Attack vector Mitigation 
the unlocked-bootloader or incorrect app 
signature would be detected. The transaction 
can be flagged to be manually verified. 
Malware installed on the sender’s phone gets 
access to keys generated by a payment 
application on the hardware-backed secure key 
storage. 
This threat is mitigated in a manner similar to 
the one where the payment application itself is 
re-packaged. 
Phishing attack by a man-in-the-middle 
pretending to be the receiver. 
The underlying cryptographic technique to 
establish the secure channel between the two 
parties prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Additionally, verified identities for merchants 
with pictures are displayed on the phone of the 
user (sender of money).  
User’s phone gets lost/stolen and gets into the 
hands of a malicious person 
Making the transaction keys require biometric 
authentication will prevent the malicious 
person from performing transactions to some 
extent. An additional PIN entry within the 
payment app can prevent unauthorized 
transactions. Thus the stolen phone cannot be 
easily used for offline transactions.  
Table 2: Various threats and their mitigations 
CONCLUSION 
Mobile payments depend on the availability of a mobile network, e.g., to enable a 
centralized service to authenticate a payment. This disclosure describes techniques to enable 
peer-to-peer mobile payments in the absence of a network. A user has an initial amount, referred 
to as the balance, that is transferred to their mobile device from a balance provider, e.g., a 
financial institution. The balance is digitally signed by both the user and the balance provider. To 
transact in the absence of a network, peer users perform a contactless payment as follows. The 
receiver of funds verifies the availability of funds by examining the prior, authenticated, 
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transaction records of the sender. A transaction record including the transaction amount is 
created and made immutable by being signed by both parties to the transaction. It is additionally 
signed with a transaction-specific keypair generated by and attested to by the sender’s device, 
and is appended to ledgers maintained at both sender and receiver. When either the sender or 
receiver regains network connectivity, the transaction is settled with the balance provider. 
Double-spend attempts by the sender are forestalled by enabling verification of the true balance 
on a sender’s device (even in the absence of a network), and by enabling the receiver to settle 
with the sender’s balance provider on the basis of an authenticated transaction record. 
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